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Abstract This paper reports the results of an experiment evaluating three regulatory
schemes for network infrastructure, in terms of their ability to generate efficient levels
of capacity investment. We compare the performance of (1) price cap regulation, (2)
a regulatory holiday for new capacity, and (3) price cap regulation with long term
contracts combined with a secondary market. The setting is one in which network
users can benefit from acting strategically, and are better informed than the network
operator about demand growth. We find that the regulatory holiday creates an incentive
to underinvest relative to optimal levels. Long term contracts also fail to improve on
single price-cap regulation, and may reduce investment by providing noisier signals
about future demand.
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1 Introduction
Some types of network infrastructure, such as gas pipelines and electricity grids,
are characterized by natural monopoly, irreversible investment in capacity, and a
lack of vertical integration between network operator and user. The sub-additive cost
structure of these networks necessitates access regulation to prevent the network oper-
ator from exploiting its market power. In the European Union, the typical approach is
to impose incentive regulation in the form of price or revenue caps.1 Cap regulation
creates an incentive for the network operator to reduce its marginal costs, but it pro-
vides weak incentives to expand capacity, and can decrease the expected profitability
of additional capacity (Vogelsang 2010).2
Several regulatory schemes exist with the specific purpose of addressing under-
investment in such industries. Under a Regulatory Holiday (see e.g. Gans and King
2003), a firm undertaking an investment is exempted from regulation of the profits from
the investment, for a pre-specified period of time. A regulatory holiday has the advan-
tages that it is easy for authorities to commit to, and carries no cost of enforcement. It
increases the expected profit from a new investment, compensating the network oper-
ator for the risk of low future demand, and thereby can create an incentive to increase
capacity.3 However, the regulatory holiday may also incentivize the network operator
to withhold or delay capacity expansion, in order to exploit potential monopoly pricing
power.
Another approach to encourage infrastructure investment is to reduce the inves-
tor’s risk by improving its information about future demand for access to its net-
work. A market for forward contracts for network access can potentially provide
this information. There are other potential advantages of forward contracting. It de-
couples the network operator’s income from potentially volatile spot market rev-
enues. Network users can use the contracts to hedge against shortages and high
spot market prices. Inclusion of a forward market might also cause the spot market
1 Within the European Union, regulatory policies vary by country, by industry, and can differ between
transmission and distribution. Furthermore, prices or revenue may be capped. For new investment in elec-
tricity distribution networks, France, Germany, and the UK use a revenue cap, while Italy employs a mix
of price cap and rate of return, and Spain has a hybrid between revenue cap and rate-of-return regulation
(Eurelectric, 2010), For gas distribution, revenue or price capping is employed in all five countries, having
been adopted in 2009 in Germany and 2011 in France. For both electricity and gas transmission, rate of
return regulation is applied in France, while capping is used in the UK, Germany, France and Spain. The
regulatory system we use in the paper as our Baseline is a price cap on capital costs. In our environment
with constant marginal cost, it is equivalent to rate-of-return regulation with an ex-post used-and-useful
rule.
2 In the European Union, there is a particular need for investment in the gas pipeline network because of
growing demand for natural gas. Around 200 Billion Euro must be invested in the energy transport networks
(gas and electricity) by 2020 (MEMO/10/582).
3 The European Union (2003) has provisions for regulatory holidays for electricity and gas networks. The
Second Gas Market Directive (2003/55/EC, Article 22) allows the granting of a regulatory holiday for
investors establishing new pipeline capacity, albeit under strict conditions. Sometimes only partial exemp-
tions are given (ERGEG 2008). A total of 13 exemptions for LNG terminals and interconnectors have been
granted (ERGEG 2009).
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to become more competitive, because of arbitrage between the spot and forward
markets.
We consider here a special type of forward contract called a Long-Term Financial
Transmission Right or LTFTR (Hogan 1992; Bushnell and Stoft 1996; Hogan et al.
2010). A network user holding such a contract receives a payment equal to the spot
price for each access right unit, regardless of whether or not she obtains units on the
spot market.4 In the implementation we study, the LTFTR are allocated with a uniform
price sealed bid auction. The use of an auction, in addition to its presumed tendency
to allocate the contracts to the most highly valued users, has the feature that it yields
an array of bids to the seller that may give her useful information about the future
demand she faces.5
We construct a laboratory experimental environment to evaluate the performance
of a regulatory holiday, and a system of forward contracting in the form of auc-
tions of LTFTR, against a baseline of price cap regulation. The criteria for eval-
uation are investment and welfare levels. We compare the regulatory schemes to
each other and to several simulated benchmarks: the social optimum, the behavior
of an unregulated monopolist, and the decisions of a profit-maximizing firm acting
within each scheme. We also compare prices, and the relative share of the surplus
that network operators, users, and the regulating authority receive, among the three
systems.
The literature on price caps and related incentives concentrates almost exclu-
sively on the relationship between regulators and network operators, and re-
duces the role of network users to perfectly competitive, rational, fully informed
price takers. Our experimental approach allows us to relax these assumptions
and to study the complex, and possibly boundedly rational, interactions be-
tween network operator and users. We point out how questionable the assump-
tion of price-taking on the part of demanders is, and we conclude that buyer
behavior should be modeled more realistically, and taken into account in any
proposed regulatory mechanism. This is particularly relevant in the energy trans-
mission market, where the small number of buyers are themselves load-serving
entities.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of the relevant
literature. Section 3 describes the experimental design while Sect. 4 presents the results
from simulations that serve as our source for null hypotheses. In Sect. 5 we present
and analyze our results. Section 6 concludes.
4 In the gas market, capacity contracts often come with a “use-it-or-lose-it” rule. If a user purchases capacity
but does not use it, it still has to pay for it, and the unused capacity will be sold by the network operator to
other network users. This contract feature prevents network users from strategically withholding network
capacity. Joskow and Tirole (2000) show that a financial transmission right is strategically equivalent to a
physical transmission right with a use-it-or-lose-it condition.
5 The auction uses lowest-accepted-bid pricing in an environment in which all bidders have multi-unit
demand. While the auction is not incentive compatible (see for example Draaisma and Noussair 1997),
experiments show that the ordering of the bidding array tends to reflect rather well the ordering of the
underlying valuations, resulting in high allocative efficiency (Alsemgeest et al. 1998).
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2 Policy issues and related literature
2.1 Policy issues
Under traditional rate-of-return regulation, rates are set to guarantee that firms recover
their investment cost. This has led to concerns that firms might overinvest (Averch and
Johnson 1962) or exert too little effort to lower cost, leading to “x-inefficiencies”. As a
result, regulators, especially in Europe, often opt for incentive regulation, typically by
setting a price cap. Under a price cap regime, firms do have strong incentives to reduce
cost.6 Indeed, Cambini and Rondi (2010) show that investment levels by European
energy companies in cost reduction are greater under incentive regulation than under
rate-of-return regulation. However incentives to undertake durable sunk investments
in new capacity are weak, especially when future demand is very uncertain.7 Network
operators face a large downside risk if an investment turns out to unprofitable, but
cannot reap the full upside benefit if it is profitable. Price cap regulation does not
take into account the real option value of investments, and thus the timing of new
investments might also not be optimal (Guthrie 2006).8
Gans and King (2004) describe how Regulatory Holidays can reduce these prob-
lems, if the duration of the regulatory holidays is appropriately chosen. Spanjer (2008)
points out that while Regulatory Holidays can alleviate underinvestment, they can
distort the timing of investments away from the optimum. Nagel and Rammerstor-
fer (2008) propose enhancing price cap regulation with revenue sharing, in order to
improve the timing of investments. Under their system, the price cap does not apply for
a portion of the installed capacity. Similarly, Vogelsang (2010) advocates regulatory
holidays only for truly innovative investments.9 In our implementation, the regulatory
holiday applies for newly built capacity by the incumbent network operator; while old
capacity remains regulated. We allow the network operator to withhold capacity from
the market.10
An LTFTR is a financial forward contract on network capacity. It is well known that
forward contracts can have beneficial effects on competition in some theoretical mod-
els. For instance, forward markets improve competition in Cournot (Allaz and Vila
6 It is often argued that incentive regulation lowers the informational requirements for the regulator. Joskow
(2005) suggests that this might not be the case in electricity networks.
7 In their excellent review, Armstrong and Sappington (2007) give an overview of various aspects in which
rate of return and price cap regulation might differ.
8 Cambini and Yiang (2009) review the evidence linking incentive regulation and investments.
9 Rosellón (2003) discusses three regulatory policies for electricity network investments and the possible
hurdles for implementing them in practice. Two of these policies roughly correspond to two of our exper-
imental treatments. One is a system of long-term financial transmission rights, as we implement in our
forward auction treatment. The second is a system where regulation attempts to take into account the real
option value of investments, as in our “regulatory holiday” treatment. The third is incentive regulation (see
also Léautier 2000), of which price cap regulation is a special case. Hogan et al. (2010) combine a Long
Term Financial Transmission Rights system with Vogelsang (2001) system of incentive regulation, in an
attempt to combine the advantages of both systems.
10 Brunekreeft and Newbery (2005) show that imposing a must-serve obligation on a merchant investor,
who is subject to a regulatory holiday, would reduce investment and welfare in most cases.
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1993) and supply function bidding (Holmberg 2011) games. Long term transportation
rights, similar to LTFTRs, have been in use for allocating network infrastructure in
the American gas market. Furthermore, Bushnell and Stoft (1996, 1997) show how
Financial Transmission Rights (FTRs) could be used in the US electricity sector to
decentralize investment decisions. The long term rights to capacity give merchant
investors an incentive to build additional pipeline capacity (Kristiansen and Rosellón
2006). Joskow and Tirole (2005), however, argue that such a system cannot easily be
implemented in the American electricity sector because of its inherent complexities.
Energy network services are separated by law from energy commodities, and this
vertical separation is called unbundling.11 There is an ongoing debate about whether
unbundling itself, independently of the type of regulation, leads to underinvestment
(see Cremer et al. 2006; von Hirschhausen 2008). Long-term contracting can be viewed
as a substitute for vertical integration, because it allows internalization of the exter-
nalities from investments. It may be particularly suitable for energy markets, which
have a few large users, since relatively few contracts would need to be made. In our
paper we impose unbundling and completely separate the network operator and users.
2.2 Previous related experimental work
Experimental methods have been applied to various economic issues arising in net-
work industries. Important early contributions include work on the allocation of airport
landing slots (Grether et al. 1981) and gas pipelines (McCabe et al. 1989, 1990). See
Staropoli and Jullien (2006) for a survey of experiments focused on electricity mar-
kets, and Normann and Ricciuti (2009) for a survey of experimental work on economic
policy issues.
Some studies have considered the behavior of auctions in experimental environ-
ments modeled on electricity markets. Rassenti et al. (2003a) find that demand side
bidding on a spot market is an effective way to discipline the pricing behavior of
a network operator. Furthermore, Rassenti et al. (2003b) find that the uniform price
auction leads to more efficient allocations in an experimental electricity market than
a discriminatory auction. These results have influenced our choice to have the market
price and allocation determined by a demand-side uniform price auction, since we
seek to minimize the inefficiency that results from the market trading rules.12
There have been some previous studies of forward contracting in markets. For
example, Krogmeier et al. (1997) and Phillips et al. (2001) compare markets in which
production can occur in response to demand, which is in essence a forward market, to
those in which production must occur in advance. Le Coq and Orzen (2006) construct
11 In the E.U., regulations No. 2009/72/EC and 2009/73/EC impose unbundling in the gas and electric-
ity markets. FERC order No. 636 (1992) imposes similar measures for intrastate pipelines in the U.S. In
the telecommunication sector, network owners are also active downstream, which affects their investment
incentives. See Klumpp and Su (2010) for an analysis of the investment incentives of a vertically integrated
firm that is subject to revenue neutral open access regulation.
12 A sizable experimental literature has considered the properties of different auction rules for generators
making offers to sell electricity to a power grid (see for example Denton et al. 2001; Abbink et al. 2003;
Vossler et al. 2009).
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an experimental environment with an explicit forward market structure. All three stud-
ies find that the forward market, operating alone, has lower prices, greater quantity
traded and greater efficiency than a spot market operating alone. Brandts et al. (2008)
find that for both quantity and supply function competition, the addition of a forward
market to a spot market lowers prices and increases production. These findings suggest
that a forward market might be effective in allocating existing capacity in our setting.
Kench (2004) conducts the only experiment, of which we are aware, that inves-
tigates financial transmission rights. He compares their performance to a system of
physical rights, in a setting in which network users obtain a random initial allocation
of rights, and then can trade them with other users. This differs from our setting, where
users buy rights from the network operator. He finds that physical rights outperform
financial rights in terms of providing accurate market signals.13 In a setting with finan-
cial rights, generators are less active in the transmission rights market, as they still have
the option to wait, and trade energy in the spot market. Furthermore, network users that
were unable to procure financial transmission rights and are therefore unhedged, bid
strategically in the spot market and lower the overall efficiency of the market system.
These results suggest the presence of LTFTR’s might change spot market bidding in
our setting. In particular, holders of LTFTR might bid high prices for capacity in the
spot market because they are insured against high prices. On the other hand, those
without LTFTR may tend to strategically underbid, with the effect of lowering prices.
There are two experimental studies that focus specifically on investment in supply
capacity in energy markets. They consider the generation and supply of energy rather
than the transport of energy as we do here. Kiesling and Wilson (2007) find that an
automated mitigation procedure (AMP), which has been proposed as an alternative
to a price cap, does not decrease investment in capacity relative to a setting in which
prices are unregulated. Williamson et al. (2006) find that investment, in an unregulated
oligopoly, is close to the Cournot-Nash level on average, with some distortion in the
mix between marginal and baseload capacities. These two studies differ from ours
in many respects, but perhaps most fundamentally in that they study oligopolies, in
contrast to the monopoly setting that is of interest to us.
3 Experimental design and procedures
The experiments took place in 12 sessions conducted at CentERlab at Tilburg Uni-
versity. The experiment was computerized and used the Ztree platform (Fischbacher
2007). There were four sessions conducted under each of three treatments. Eight sub-
jects were recruited for each session using an online recruiting system. All participants
were undergraduate students at Tilburg University, with the majority from the School
of Economics and Management. After the instructions were read out aloud, subjects
had the opportunity to ask questions and subsequently participated in a paper and
13 In contrast to our paper, Kench (2004) considers the auctioning of two complimentary goods: the com-
modity that is being traded, electricity, and the transportation capacity, access to the transmission line. We
consider only the market for transportation capacity. Kench also distinguishes three types of network users:
buyers of electricity, producers of electricity upstream from the congested line, and produces downstream
from the congested line.
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pencil quiz. The quiz consisted of questions and calculation-exercises designed to test
the subjects’ understanding of the experiment’s proceedings and market institutions.
The quiz took about 10 minutes to complete. Subjects were made aware that the param-
eters used in the calculation exercises were not indictative of those to be encountered
during the experiment. The experimenter then checked the answers, handed the quiz-
sheets back to the subjects and discussed the correct answers. The three subjects with
the greatest number of mistakes were then informed that they could not participate in
the experiment and were paid 10 Euro for their participation. Of the remaining five
subjects, the best-performing one was assigned to the role of network operator while
the remaining four were network users.
Subjects participated in three independent sequences of periods. Initially, there was
a twelve period training sequence which did not count toward participants’ earnings,
followed by two 30 period sequences which did count. The data from the last 30-period
sequence is used for the analysis in this paper. Sessions lasted from 3–3.5 hours. The
instructions and the quiz took on average between 60 and 75 minutes.14
In our experiment, the regulator is passive, and does not adjust policy based on
prior activity. The regulatory schemes are exogenously imposed, and implemented
with complete certainty. Regulator revenue is not rebated to participants and is thus
assumed to be spent outside this sector. Our design allows the regulatory regimes to
be compared ceteris parabus, and a focus on the interaction of network operator and
user.
3.1 The environment
Aggregate Demand in each period t is of the form:
Dt = a − 2b
gt
qt (1)
where a and b are constants, qt is the quantity of the product, access to the network
offered by the network operator, and gt is a growth parameter. The inverse demand is
calculated by evaluating (1) for qt ∈ [0, 23] and rounding to the closest multiple of
10.15 Individual demand is private information.
Access to the network is supplied by a single network operator. In order to supply a
unit of the product, the network operator must possess a sufficient quantity of network
14 While this experiment is very complex from the point of view of participants relative to many other
experiments, it is less so than some other paradigms that members of the same subject pool have partici-
pated in (see for example Noussair et al. 2011). To allow for learning the task, we use only the last horizon
in our data analysis. The length of each session, 3 - 3.5 hours, is long in comparison to most other studies,
but we have successfully implemented other experiments that exceed four hours. To incentivize partici-
pants over this relatively long period of time, subject payments were substantial. They averaged 30.45 Euro
(1 Euro = US$1.38) for network operators and 23.61 Euro for users in the baseline treatment. The compa-
rable figures are 34.25 for operators and 21.65 for users in the Regulatory Holiday treatment, and 30.94 for
operators and 24.31 for users under Forward Auction.
15 Figure A1.1 in the Appendix indicates the demand realization for each of the 30 periods of the experiment
and also illustrates the time profile of gt .
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capacity. For each unit of network capacity, one unit of the product can be sold in
each period. The installation of additional network capacity itself is costless for the
operator, but each unit of network capacity imposes a cost of c ECU (experimental
currency units) in each period, regardless of whether it was actually used to provide a
unit of the product or not.16 Network capacity cannot be dismantled once it has been
installed. There is no depreciation or scrap value for capacity. The total capacity of
the network in period t is designated as Kt , and the initial network capacity as K0.
The irreversibility of investment means that Kt ≥ Kt−1 for all t .
3.2 The spot market
In each period, the product is allocated by means of a uniform-price sealed-bid auc-
tion with lowest-accepted-bid pricing. Network users can submit one bid for each
one of their valuations. The network operator then decides how many units of the
product it offers. If the operator offers q units of the product, the q highest bids
are accepted and the q-th highest bid sets the market price p for the current pe-
riod. All units of the product are sold at this market price. A price cap of pcap ECU
is in effect. If the market price exceeds the cap, the operator receives pcap ECU
per unit of the product while network users pay the market price p. The result-
ing difference is kept by the experimenter and can be thought of as transferred
to the regulating authority.17 Figure 1 shows the rents that each of the three par-
ties receive when q units are sold in a period. The dotted line shows the revealed
demand implied by the bids in the auction. The area between c and pcap and 0
to q, defines a rectangle that indicates the profit to the network operator equal to
(pcap − c) ·q. The rectangle immediately above indicates the revenue to the regulator
of (p − pcap) · q. The darkened region above that is the consumer surplus accruing
to the users.
3.3 Timing of activity and parameters
The 30 periods are divided into five six-period “blocks”. At the beginning of the first
period of each block, the four network users learn their individual demand for each
period in the current block. The users can then choose to increase the valuations from
their initial level for their first two units by either the fixed value κLOW , another fixed
16 The per-period cost c can be seen as the leasing cost or rental price of network capacity. We use this fram-
ing, instead of a lump-sum capacity cost, because it allows subjects to compare capital costs and revenues
more easily, and avoids the need to impose a scrap value for the last period of the experiment.
17 We do not induce any framing for the subjects concerning where the revenue is directed. In our exposition
here, we designate it as “government/regulating-authority revenue” and include it in the calculation of total
welfare. The use of an auction corresponds with E.U. Regulation 1228/2003 which imposes a market-based
allocation mechanism for cross-border network capacity and forbids for instance “first come, first serve”
rationing. Regulation 1228/2003 also limits the auction revenues the network operator can receive, in order
to prevent it from making too little capacity available. By allowing the prices paid by the users and the
capped price received by the operator to differ, we avoid non-price rationing. Non-price rationing would
decouple a user’s profit from its bidding strategy to some extent; users’ bids might consequently be less
informative about the underlying demand.
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Fig. 1 Price cap regulation (B)
value κHIGH , or 0, for all periods in the current block. To do so, they incur per-period
costs of γLOW , γHIGH , or 0, respectively.18 Figure A1.2 in the Appendix provides an
illustration of the valuations under the assumption that all users raise their valuations
by κHIGH .
In the first and the fourth period of each block, that is, in every third period begin-
ning in period 1, the network operator decides whether or not to increase the capacity
of the network. The maximum amount of additional capacity which can be installed
at each of these opportunities is KMAX. The operator makes its decision prior to
the spot auction of the current period. Network users are informed of any changes in
network capacity before they submit their bids in the spot auction. Table 1 provides
the values for all parameters discussed in this section. The choices of parameter values
are explained in Appendix C.
3.4 Treatments
There were three treatments, Baseline (B), Regulatory Holiday (RH), and Forward
Auction (FA). Sections 3.1–3.3 described the Baseline treatment. The next two sub-
sections indicate the differences between the Baseline and the other two treatments.
3.4.1 Regulatory holiday (RH)
In the RH treatment, sales of newly installed capacity are exempt from the price cap.
Thus, we in effect implement our regulatory holiday as in Nagel and Rammerstorfer
(2008). We tax the difference between the market price and the price cap on old capac-
18 This opportunity to increase one’s valuations is meant to represent the take-or-pay contracts that are
common in Europe. These are contracts that provide a network user, typically a gas company, with the
opportunity to make a long-term contract with an upstream supplier. These contracts are lucrative but also
costly to break by failing to take delivery of the contracted quantity. This leads to greater valuations for
the corresponding units of network capacity. The cost to users of increasing these valuations represents the
various costs of concluding such a contract and the penalty that one incurs if the contracted quantity is not
exchanged. We added this feature of the market, as discussions with stakeholders indicated that it was an
essential feature of European gas markets.
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Table 1 Parameters
Parameter Value Description
a 80 Intercept parameter in aggregate demand function
b 5 Slope parameter in aggregate demand function
c 10 Per period cost for one unit of network capacity
pcap = f cap 15 Price Cap
κLOW 20 Low optional increase of the highest two valuations of a network user
κHIGH 40 High optional increase of the highest two valuations of a network user
γLOW 10 Per period cost for raising highest two valuations by κLOW
γHIGH 20 Per period cost for raising highest two valuations by κHIGH
K0 4 Initial network capacity
KMAX 5 Maximum possible investment at each investment opportunity
Fig. 2 Regulatory holiday (RH)
ity, but exempt newly built capacity from the tax. The RH treatment differs from the
Baseline treatment only with regard to the number of product units to which the price
cap is applied in the spot market. The price cap is suspended for those units of capacity
that were added in the current six-period block. The suspension lasts until the onset
of the subsequent six-period block.
The payoff structure in RH is illustrated in Fig. 2. The figure shows that the units
between Kold and Knew are not subject to the price cap. The regulator revenue is equal
to (p − pcap) ·Kold and the profits to the network operator equal (pcap − c) ·Kold +
(p − c) · (Knew − Kold).
3.4.2 Forward auctioning (FA)
In the FA treatment, an auction for LTFTR is conducted in the first period of each six
period block. The auction takes place after the network users have been informed about
their valuations, but prior to their decision about whether to increase their valuations
and prior to the network operator’s decision to install additional network capacity.
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Fig. 3 Forward auctioning (FA). Forward market (left) and spot market (right)
The LTFTR which are auctioned are forward contracts which pay the network user
who obtains them the spot price of one product unit in each period of the current
block, regardless whether or not that user actually obtains units of the product in the
spot market. The forward auction is a uniform price auction with lowest-accepted-bid
pricing. All network users pay the same per-unit, per-period market price f and there
is a price-cap of f cap ECU in place.
The network operator must offer to sell every unit of the product it has in the for-
ward auction. It also must offer the maximum number of units of the product that it
can provide with its current network capacity in the spot auction. This implies that the
operator always uses its entire revenue from the spot auction to compensate the net-
work users who acquired forward contracts. Thus, its profit is determined exclusively
in the forward market.19 The spot market is effectively a secondary market.
The operator’s profit is shown in Fig. 3. In the figure on the left, the revealed demand
in the forward auction is indicated in the dashed line labeled “Forward Demand”. The
profit to the network operator is given by (f cap − c) ·K, and regulator payoff is equal
to (f − f cap) · K . The figure on the right presents the spot market. The revealed
demand in the spot market is illustrated with the dashed line labeled “Spot Demand”.
The surplus of the buyers in the spot market is given by the darker area. The auction
revenue given by p · K is transferred from buyers in the spot market to holders of
LTFTR, and thus (p − f ) · K indicates the profit accruing to holders of LTFTR. The
sum of both areas is the total profit of network users.
The differences in the timing of activity between treatments are illustrated in
Tables 2 and 3. The columns indicate the period within the six-period block, and
the rows list the activities that take place. An X indicates that the activity occurs
within the applicable period.
19 The network operator must offer all capacity in the forward market. This is a feature of actual markets
in the field. For instance, FERC only allows investments in gas pipelines if “…the shippers [are] willing
to purchase capacity at a rate that pays the full costs of the project,…” (Carr 2005). In the PJM electricity
market, FTR’s are offered to bidders as long as the associated flows are technically feasible. For this the
network operator conducts the “simultaneous feasibility test” (PJM 2009).
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Table 2 Timing of activity in the baseline (B) and regulatory holiday (RH) treatments
Period within six period block
1 2 3 4 5 6
Users learn their individual valuations for periods 1–6 X
Users decide whether to raise their highest two
valuations at a cost X
Operator decides whether to install additional
network capacity X X
Spot Auction X X X X X X
Table 3 Timing of activity in the forward auctioning (FA) treatment
Period within six period block
1 2 3 4 5 6
Users learn their individual valuations for periods 1–6 X
Network users bid for LTFTR capacity X
Operator builds additional network capacity, sells all capacity
in LTFTR X X
Users decide whether to raise their highest two valuations
at a cost X
Spot auction X X X X X X
4 Benchmarks
We use three benchmarks against which to compare the performance of the regulatory
mechanisms we consider. The first benchmark is the outcome of the decisions of a
benevolent social planner with perfect foresight and facing no regulation, where users
pay the competitive equilibrium spot price. The social planner maximizes the sum
of user surplus, network operator profit, and government revenue over the 30-period
horizon. We also use this theoretical benchmark as a denominator to calculate the effi-
ciency levels of all treatments. The efficiency level provides a measure of the extent
to which the maximum possible gains from exchange are realized. The second and
third benchmarks correspond to the behavior of a profit maximizing monopolist with
perfect foresight, facing the regulatory regimes we implement in the experiment: (1)
price cap regulation, and (2) a regulatory holiday for new capacity. We assume that all
four network users committed to the largest possible demand increase in each period.
We use the price cap regulation benchmark to compare prices and investment levels
for both the B and FA treatments.
Figure 4 summarizes the results of the three benchmark simulations, as well as the
case of an unregulated monopoly. The total shaded area is the overall market surplus
generated. The differently-colored shadings distinguish the network operator’s profit,
the network users’ surplus and, in cases where the market is regulated, the revenue
for the government. Price cap regulation generates a total surplus that is close to
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Fig. 4 Operator profit, user surplus, and government revenue
Fig. 5 Spot prices over time: treatment averages
the social planner level. However, the surplus of the network operator is lower
under the price cap than under the social planner’s policy. The reason for this is that
under the social planner’s policy, the network operator can earn prices which are as
high as 20 in periods with relatively scarce supply, while prices are capped at 15 under
price cap regulation. The total surplus under the regulatory holiday is considerably
lower, as the amount of investment remains low, and hence prices remain high. The
government benefits from the regulatory holiday, as it can collect a large amount of
revenue from the units that are subject to a price cap. The network operator also earns
more revenue under the regulatory holiday than under the price cap regulation, since
it obtains monopoly rents on newly built capacity.
5 Results
5.1 Prices and capacity
Figure 5 depicts the time series of spot prices for each of the three treatments. Each
line presents the average over the four sessions comprising the treatment. The figure
also presents the simulation results for the price cap and the regulatory holiday. The
simulated outcomes for FA are identical to the B treatment.
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Constant 5.83* (3.24) −2.68*** (0.56) 0.90*** (0.02) 0.97*** (0.02) 0.92*** (0.02)
RH tmt. 9.29** (4.30) −0.18 (1.03) −0.05 (0.03) 0.00 (0.01) −0.05 (0.03)
FA tmt. 21.30*** (7.13) −0.48 (0.79) −0.06 (0.03) −0.03*** (0.00) −0.04 (0.03)
N (obs.) 360 360 360 359 359
R2 0.16 0.01 0.05 0.06 0.05
Prob > Chi2 0.01 0.83 0.06 0.00 0.20
*p < .1, **p < .05, ***p < .01
Prices in the Baseline treatment are very close to those in the corresponding price
cap simulations, especially from period 8 onward. This suggests that network opera-
tors are behaving close to optimally in the Baseline treatment, and that the cognitive
demands of the experiment are within the capabilities of our subjects. Prices in the
other two treatments are generally greater than under the Baseline.
The impressions of Fig. 5 are supported by statistical tests. Using a random effects
regression of prices on a constant and two treatment dummy-variables, we find that
spot prices in the FA and the RH treatments are significantly greater than in the Base-
line treatment. This can be seen in the first column of Table 4. In the table RH-tmt and
FA-tmt are dummy variables that equal 1 if the observation is from the RH and FA
treatments, respectively, and zero otherwise. The dependent variable is the observed
price minus the simulated price under the social planner’s policy. Error terms are
assumed to be clustered at the session level (see Fréchette 2007). In the Baseline treat-
ment, spot prices are 5.8 ECU (experimental currency units) greater than in the social
optimum. Prices in the RH and the FA treatments are, respectively, 9.3 and 21.3 ECU
greater than in the Baseline.20
In the forward auction treatment there are two current prices at any time, the spot
price and the forward price of the last auction for LTFTR. Figure 6 shows how the two
prices compare on average. It indicates that the spot price is generally considerably
greater, by an average of 14.43 ECU. The forward price fails to give an unbiased
estimate of the future spot price. Arbitrage between the forward market and the spot
market does not succeed in eliminating the price gap.
Figure 7 shows the average capacity over time in each of the three treatments, and
in the two benchmark simulations. The price cap simulation has a steadily increasing
capacity over the 30 periods, with an interval of constant capacity that corresponds to
20 In addition to parametric regressions, we also conduct non-parametric Mann Whitney tests for treatment
differences, in which the conservative assumption that each session is one unit of observation is made.
These fully concur with the results of the regression analysis with regard to treatment differences. In the
rest of this section, we report the results of the random effects regressions; the results of the non-parametric
tests can be found in Appendix B.
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Fig. 6 Spot price and LTFTR price in the forward treatment: averages over all sessions
Fig. 7 Installed capacity, treatment averages
a decrease in demand that occurs from periods 14 to 18. Under the regulatory holiday,
the monopolist keeps the initial investment levels low, in order to obtain the monopoly
profit over a long interval of periods.
In the Baseline treatment the amount of installed capacity falls consistently short of
the price cap benchmark. It does, however, exceed the levels in the other two treatments
in the early periods, thereafter falling behind in the late periods. The pace of capacity
expansion seems to be largely unaffected by the temporary drop in demand in RH,
while in the other two treatments investment recovers more slowly. The second column
of data in Table 4 reports regressions of the shortfall of investment on a constant term
and the treatment dummies. The shortfall is defined as the actual installed capacity
minus the socially optimal quantity. There are no significant treatment effects, but the
amount of available capacity in all treatments is lower than socially optimal.
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5.2 Demand for capacity
There is substantial underbidding in the spot market in the B and RH treatments, as
well as in the forward market in FA. There is also more variability in demand in FA than
in the other two treatments. Full demand revelation occurs on average only in the spot
market in FA, but is nevertheless characterized by a mix of over- and underbidding.
The low spot prices in B and RH appear to induce a belief on the part of the network
operator that spot demand is weak. In FA, the fact that forward prices are variable, as
well as lower than spot prices, may induce a belief that future demand is volatile and
likely to decline. These inferences would have a negative effect on investment in all
treatments.
To analyze bidding behavior, we distinguish between (a) revealed demand, the
demand function equivalent to the array of bids that users submit, and (b) underlying
demand, corresponding to their induced willingness to pay. We construct a smoothed
normalized market revealed demand function. In order to compute this function, we
first array all of the bids of the users from highest to lowest to obtain a market revealed
demand function. The market revealed demand function is then normalized, by divid-
ing it by the underlying demand, evaluated at the price cap. This normalization corrects
for changes in demand over time. We then use a LOESS kernel regression (Cleveland
1979) to smooth the normalized functions over the 30 periods and 4 sessions that make
up each treatment. Each smoothed revealed demand function summarizes information
from 2880 price-quantity vectors.21
Figure 8 shows the revealed demand in the market. Each dot corresponds to the
normalized revealed quantity demanded, evaluated at a given price for a group in a
given period. Thus, for each group in each period, there is one dot for each quantity
step in the inverse aggregate revealed demand function. Lines in each panel of the fig-
ure show the smoothed normalized revealed demand function and its 60% confidence
intervals for the spot market of the B, FA and RH treatments, and for the forward
market of the FA treatment. The figure also presents the underlying demand function,
using the same technique for normalization.
In the spot markets under B and RH, and in the forward market under FA, it appears
that strategic underbidding is the primary source of the underrevelation of demand evi-
dent in the figure. Comparison of the error bounds shows that demand uncertainty,
from the point of view of the network operator, is greater in the forward market under
Forward Auction. This may be due to the complexity of formulating a bid in the for-
ward market, where users have to aggregate their own demand function for several
future periods, and take into account expectations about future spot prices. This would
lead to more heterogeneous revealed demand functions, as different bidders solve this
bid formulation problem differently.
In the FA spot markets, users who are hedged with LTFTR and who do wish to
purchase the corresponding units have no incentive to underbid and reduced cost from
overbidding, since they are rebated the market price for these units. This tends to off-
set the strategic underbidding of other agents, and allows prices in the spot market to
21 4 treatments * 30 time periods * 24 price quantity vectors (one for each possible quantity demanded).
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roughly correspond to underlying demand on average. However, as a consequence the
revealed demand function in the spot market is not only less elastic than the revealed
demand function in the forward market, but also less elastic than underlying demand.
5.3 Efficiency
We now compare the treatments in terms of the total surplus they generate and how





Fig. 8 Smoothed normalized market: revealed and underlying demand. a Baseline, b regulatory holiday,
c forward auctioning, forward market, d forward auctioning, spot market
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Table 5 Observed and simulated efficiency, all treatments














Differ. (4 – 3) (%)
Baseline 89.6 97.3 92.0 99.5 7.5
Regulatory holiday 84.3 96.9 87.1 89.2 2.1
Forward auctioning 83.3 94.6 88.0 99.5 11.5
the total welfare realized in each period, Wt, the sum of consumer surplus, network
operator’s profit and regulatory revenue, divided by the total welfare generated in the
social planner simulation in the same period, W ∗t :
ηT ott = Wt/W ∗t (2)
The first column of Table 5 gives the treatment averages for total efficiency. Observed
efficiency is greatest in the Baseline treatment: close to 90% of the maximum feasible
welfare level is realized. The values for the RH and FA treatments are 84% and 83%,
respectively. We decompose total efficiency into two multiplicative components: allo-
cative and dynamic efficiency. Allocative efficiency is a measure of how well the spot
market performs in awarding the current capacity to the demanders with the greatest
valuations. If the highest-valued users fail to receive the units, allocative inefficiency
exists. The allocative efficiency ηat in period t is defined as:
ηat = Wt/Wot (Kt ) (3)
where Wot (Kt ) is the welfare level resulting from allocating the current capacity Kt
to the users with the highest valuations.
Dynamic efficiency is a measure of the optimality of the timing and the size of
investments. Dynamic efficiency is the fraction of the globally optimal welfare that
could be reached with an efficient allocation of the actual current capacity. Dynamic
efficiency is defined as:
ηdt = Wot (Kt ) /W ∗t (4)
The second column of Table 5 reports that allocative efficiency is almost identical
in the B and RH treatments (97%). It is, however, significantly lower in FA (94%). In
the B and RH treatments, although users bid strategically by lowering their bids, the
individual ranking of their bids still reflects their ranking of willingness to pay.
The results do not support the contention that the forward market improves
allocative efficiency. Rather, they suggest that the allocation in the two-stage mar-
ket consisting of a forward market followed by a spot market, is less efficient than in
a spot market operating alone, as in the Baseline and Regulatory Holiday treatments.
The spot market does improve the initial allocation of the forward market. The forward
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Table 6 Distribution of surplus among the three types of agents
Operator’s profit Users’ profit Government revenue
Constant 44.55*** 1.69 499.65*** 34.91 86.97*** 27.28
Holiday 24.46*** 4.06 −69.31 51.36 15.93 32.00
Forward −0.05 4.36 −80.92 79.03 44.38 66.65
Obs. 360 360 360
R2 0.22 0.03 0.03
Prob. > χ2 0.00 0.00 0.00
market allocates the network capacity at an average allocative efficiency of 89 %. The
spot market improves the allocation by 5%.
The third column of Table 5 indicates that dynamic efficiency is also greatest in the
Baseline treatment (92%) and somewhat lower in the other two treatments. Dynamic
efficiency averages 88% in the Forward Auction treatment and 87% in the Regulatory
Holiday Treatment. However, as shown in Table 4, none of the differences between
treatments is significant.
The fourth column of Table 5 reports the efficiency levels obtained in the corre-
sponding simulations. These yield total efficiencies of 99.5%, 89.2 % and 99.5% for
the Baseline, the Regulatory Holiday, and the Forward Auction treatment, respectively.
The fifth column compares the dynamic efficiency of the simulations and the exper-
imental results. The inefficiency in the RH treatment is anticipated in the simulation
results and is consistent with strategic underinvestment on the part of the network
operator to exploit market power. However, in the FA treatment, the efficiency level
is considerably lower than in the simulation, due to lower investment.
The division of payoffs among the three type of stakeholder, network operator,
user, and regulatory authority, differs by treatment. Table 6 reports the results of a
regression analysis, in which a constant and treatment dummies are the independent
variables and the profits of each type of agent are the dependent variables. In the Base-
line treatment, the bulk of the surplus is in the form of consumer surplus. Under the
regulatory holiday, government revenue decreases, as it taxes fewer units than under
the other policies. Consumer surplus declines and network operator profit increases
relative to the other policies, since the network operator is free to charge high prices,
and there are fewer units of capacity available. Under the forward auction, there are
no significant differences from the Baseline treatment. The high spot prices in FA do
induce an insignificant increase in government revenue and reduction in consumer
surplus.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we have used an experimental approach to evaluate two policies that
have been proposed to induce an operator of a network to increase capacity along an
efficient time trajectory. The baseline that we use is an industry with a cap on fees
for use of its capacity. This is the typical status of network operators in the European
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gas, electric, and telecommunications industries.22 Our price cap is set at a level at
which an optimizing network operator would operate at close to the social optimum
if demanders behaved as naïve price takers, and the operators could fully anticipate
all shocks to demand. However, the environment is complex, users have some mar-
ket power, and there is no way for a firm to anticipate the unpredictable changes in
demand, so that some inefficiency might be expected. Indeed in the Baseline treatment,
the realized surplus is roughly 10% below the optimal level. In the Baseline, as in the
other two treatments, less than one half of the inefficiency is due to misallocation
of existing capacity. This indicates that the uniform price auction performs well at
allocating units to users with the highest valuations and most inefficiency is a result
of suboptimal capacity investment.
We find that a regulatory holiday fails to close this gap and, on the contrary, causes
it to widen. This is predicted by the simulation analysis that we have conducted that
assumes an optimizing monopolist. The removal of a price cap on marginal units
causes the firm to slow capacity expansion relative to the Baseline treatment, reduc-
ing the quantity of access units supplied to the market closer to the monopoly level.
This behavior serves to increase prices and shift rent away from consumers and to
the firm. Efficiency losses are mainly due to suboptimally low investment in capacity,
and are reflected in dynamic inefficiencies. In principle, a regulatory holiday enhances
incentives to invest (Gans and King 2003, 2004) and can positively affect market com-
petition in an oligopoly or a competitive market. However, in our monopoly setting,
the regulatory holiday also encourages the exercise of market power.
Forward auctioning also generates lower surplus than the price cap. These ineffi-
ciencies were unanticipated from our simulations. Capacity expansion is slower and
prices are higher than under the price cap alone, as well as in comparison to the
simulation. Spot prices are closer to underlying demand than in the Baseline and
the Regulatory Holiday treatments. Forward auctioning improves price discovery in
the spot market. However, strategic bidding behavior reduces allocative efficiency by
severing the close link between bids and underlying valuations. Forward prices in the
Forward Auction treatment are more volatile than spot prices in the Baseline and the
Regulatory Holiday treatment. This may lead the network operator in FA to believe
that future demand is volatile and reduce investment incentives. This reduces dynamic
efficiency. In principle, by selling LTFTRs, the network operator locks-in the price
of transmission capacity for several periods and can reduce its revenue uncertainty.
However, in our experiment, the effect of increased volatility appears to outweigh that
of additional hedging opportunities.
Although the Forward Auction treatment did not perform as well as the Baseline,
the opposite might be the case under different market conditions. For example, as
uncertainty about demand growth increases, the network operator might find it harder
to determine the optimal level of investments in the Baseline treatment and the addi-
22 One interesting additional treatment would be to look at a different Baseline environment with no price
cap regulation. This would allow the network operator to extract monopoly rents over his entire capacity.
Operator behavior in the regulatory holiday treatment suggests that an unregulated monopolist would be
Footnote 22 continued
able to readily withhold new investment and raise prices to well above competitive levels. This would likely
result in low dynamic efficiency.
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tional information LTFTRs provide might lead to better investment decisions. Further-
more, improvements to the design of the LTFTR auctions might enhance allocative
efficiency. For example, increasing the contract duration of LTFTRs would reduce the
risk for the network operators and mitigate the downside of increased volatility.
Another feature of our design is that the regulatory authority is passive. This facili-
tates a focus on the economic effects of the regulatory policies themselves, since they
are applied exogenously and are fixed for the duration of the life of the economy. An
interesting agenda for follow-up work would be to assign experimental participants
as regulators, and give them discretion over regulatory policy. This would allow them
to test different policies and then to settle on ones they believe are working well. It
would also permit the investigation of network operators’ and users’ reaction to policy
uncertainty. Different treatments could investigate the effect of varying the regulator’s
objective function, available set of policies, and commitment power.
Regulatory holidays and LTFTR are institutional features that have been proposed
to increase capacity investment by a regulated monopoly. They are supported by solid
economic intuition that they would perform well. However, such intuition relies on
specific assumptions about how agents interpret and use institutions, and these assump-
tions may or may not be satisfied. The two systems were not successful, and indeed
were counterproductive, in our setting. In particular, the data highlight the strategic
behavior of network users in influencing the efficiency of the different regulatory
schemes. Underrevelation of demand, present in all of the treatments, may lead the
network operator to optimize for a level of demand considerably lower than the true
level. Strategic behavior in the Forward Auction treatment reduced allocative effi-
ciency and increased volatility, leading to lower investment levels. In our view, our
results constitute an example of the value of laboratory experimental tests of new
policies before they are applied in the field.
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Appendix A: Demand valuations
See Figs. A-1 and A-2.
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Fig. A-1 Demand valuation of the network users for each period and for each unit (no extra valuation)
Appendix B: Additional regressions
We replicate the results of regression model reported in Table 4 with a non-parametric
Mann Whitney test. The null hypothesis for the two-sided version of the test is that
the two treatments come from the same distribution and in the one-sided test that the
relationship is opposite in sign to the one in the Table B-1.
Appendix C: Parameter specification
Our experiment is calibrated to ensure that key variables and ratios take on similar
values in the experiment as in the field. The parameters to be chosen consist of those
listed in Table 1, as well as the timing of activity and the average and variance of
demand growth gt .
C.1 Price cap and capacity cost, pcap and c





, links the potential benefits
of an investment with the capital cost of new capacity. The ratio is calibrated using
information about the capital cost of a typical network operator.
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Fig. A-2 Demand valuation of the network users for each period and for each unit (extra valuation)
Table B-1 Mann Whitney tests
Holiday—price cap Forward—price cap Holiday—price cap
1-sided 2-sided 1-sided 2-sided 1-sided 2-sided
Table 4
1  Actual and optimal spot pricea 0.057* 0.114 0.014** 0.029** 0.243 0.486
2 Actual and optimal capacity 0.443 0.886 0.343 0.686 0.443 0.886
3 General efficiency 0.243 0.486 0.057* 0.114 0.557 1
4 Static efficiency 0.171 0.343 0.343 0.686 0.014** 0.029**
5 Dynamic efficiency 0.1* 0.2 0.171 0.343 0.557 1
Table 6
6 Network operator’s surplus 0.014** 0.029** 0.557 1 0.014** 0.029**
7 Network users’ surplus 0.171 0.343 0.243 0.486 0.443 0.886
8 Government revenue 0.443 0.886 0.557 1 0.443 0.886
Results with two asterisks are significant at the 5% level, one asterisk at the 10% level
a The efficient spot price is calculated for the actual invested capacity
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Fig. C-1 Demand, cost and profit of network operator
We assume that the network operator’s costs can be divided into two components.
Some costs, e ·K , are proportional to capacity K and are fixed in the short run. Others,
d · Q, are proportional to quantity supplied and are variable in the short-run. The
accounting profit π that the firm earns is distributed to shareholders, in a manner
proportional to equity and thus to installed capacity, so that π = r · K . Therefore:
π = r · K = pacc · Q + e · K + d · Q
with pacc the accounting price. These values are illustrated in Fig. C-1. d · Q is given
in green (light shading), c ·K in orange (dark shading), and r ·Kis equal to the area A
minus B. Actual investment behavior is however not driven by accounting profit, but
by economic profit, which is equal to accounting profit minus the opportunity cost of
capital. The latter cost is assumed to be proportional to the risk free-rate, rf · K and
reflects the fact there are alternative uses for capital. Alternative investment options
are not part of the experiment, and the opportunity cost of capital therefore needs to
be reflected in the capital cost parameter c (Fig. C-1).
We use data of the Belgian gas transportation company Fluxis (2010) to calibrate
the parameters (Table C-1). We assume that half of the costs, other than payments to
shareholders and bondholders, are capacity related, and the other half are transpor-
tation related. The relative size of the payments to shareholders and the bondholders
depends on the respective interest rates and the capital structure of the firm. Fluxis
has a weighted average cost of capital (WACC) of 6.6%. Its return on equity (ROE) is
about 10%, bondholders receive about 4% interest, and the firm has a debt to capital
ratio of 40%. Those numbers are very similar to other utilities, and thus it is not an





is approximately one fifth of the total payment to shareholders.
23 Oxera (2011) reports WACCs for European network operators ranging from 6.01% to 6.51%, and esti-
mates the ROE of the Dutch gas network operator GTS in the range of [6.5, 9.8%]. Macolm and Olsen
(2011) observe an average ROE of 17% for pipelines in the U.S.
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Table C-1 Allocation of revenue of Fluxis and interpretation in our experiment





Revenue 100 100 (paccQ)
Payments to shareholders 26 26 (rK) 0
(10% of equity)
Payments to bondholders 15 15 component of (eK) 0
(4% of debt)
Other costsb 59 29.5 component of (eK) 29.5 (dK)
Opportunity cost of – 5.2 (rf K)
capitalc (2% of equity)
a Data in this column is based on Fluxis’ accounts
b Other costs (total 59%), consists of personnel cost (21%), services (25%), consumables (6%) and exploi-
tation (7%)
c
“Opportunity cost of capital” is assumed to be one fifth of the “payments to shareholders”
There are no variable costs d · Q in our experiment. We wish to construct similar
ratios of net revenue to total capital costs in our experiment as those given in Table
C-1, namely
pcap · Q
c · K =
(pacc − d)Q
(rf + e)K =
100 − 29.5




To achieve this, pcap/c would be set at 1.42 if K = Q. However, in our environ-
ment, we could expect K to modestly exceed Q on average because of temporary
overinvestment or low demand, and thus the actual realized ratio of pcap/c to be
lower than the level specified under the assumption that K = Q. Hence we set the
ratio equal to 1.5 in the event that K = Q. Setting c arbitrarily at 10, we thus obtain
pcap = 15.
C.2 Equilibrium price and Demand Elasticity, p∗, a, and b





, close to estimates of the demand function for natural gas. Using time
series data from 1973 till 1999, Krichene (2002) finds short-run demand elastici-
ties for natural gas of −0.1, and long-run elasticities of −1.1. We use this range
of estimates to calibrate the demand function in our experimental environment, and
specify equilibrium demand elasticities to be between the short-run and long-run esti-
mates.
In the experiment the variable costs of transportation d · Q are zero. This is not
the case in practice. In order to compute demand elasticities that are comparable with
the field, we add the variable cost to the experimental price to obtain a comparable
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consumer buyer price p∗, and calculate demand elasticities at that new price level,
while keeping the level of output and the demand slope constant. At the price cap
pcap = 15, the comparable price level is found by equalizing the following ratios of









This price p∗ = 15 ∗ 1.41 = 21.15, is close to 20, the predicted buyer price for all
periods beginning in period 5 in our simulation of the Benchmark Price Cap treat-
ment. At the price cap pcap = 15, and given demand parameter a = 80, the demand
elasticity is −0.31. Because the intercept with the price-axis a does not change, the
demand elasticity at any given price level remains constant over time, even as demand
grows. The actual observed market prices, where revealed demand equaled supply, in
the experiment were typically between 23 and 38 (this is the price that users pay). In
this price range the demand elasticity is greater than at the price cap, and closer to −1,
but smaller than −1 in absolute value. Thus, for the prices observed in our experiment,
the demand elasticity is bounded by the short-run and long-run estimates of Krichene
(2002) study.
The parameter b is set sufficiently large, so that market demand would not grow
too large over the 30 periods; otherwise network users would have to bid for too many
units of capacity and the experiment would slow down. On the other hand, b was set
sufficiently small so that all network users would have positive quantity demanded in
the first period. Thus, demand in the experiment was a discrete approximation of the
function p = 80 − 10 (qt/gt).
C.3 Demand growth, gt , time horizon, and demand uncertainty








we use the forecasts of world energy outlook of the International Energy Agency (IEA).
The IEA (1999) world energy outlook gives an average demand growth of 1.5 % per
year in its reference scenario. In our experiment we have a demand growth of 3.5%
per period. Thus, each period in our experiment represents approximately 2.33 years.
The time horizon of the experiment is 30 periods, which corresponds to a 70 year
time frame. In the field, the useful lifetime of gas pipelines is 50 years for accounting
purposes, but if pipelines are well-maintained their lifetime can be extended beyond
this period. Thus, an overall life of 70 years is realistic for the type of infrastructure
investments that we consider. The forward contracts in the experiment last up to 6 peri-
ods, corresponding to 14 years in the field. Von Hirschhausen and Neumann (2008)
report that the typical contract duration for bilateral European gas contracts is about
19 years (with a standard deviation of 8 years). However, in practice tradable forward
contracts often have a shorter duration.
The uncertainty about the demand growth can be measured as the standard devia-







. For this parameter we compare possible outcomes
in our model with the range of predictions of the IEA. The IEA 2009 report gives
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three alternative scenarios for demand predictions over the period 2007–2030. The
first alternative scenario assumes that future CO2 concentrations would be limited to
450ppm. The demand growth for gas would then slow to 0.7% per year. Two other
scenarios look at the sensitivity of the growth rate with respect to price dynamics. In
a high-and a low-price scenario, demand growth is predicted to be 1.3 and 1.8% per
year, respectively. Hence the IEA reports alternative scenarios with growth rates of
0.7, 1.3 and 1.8%.
After modeling the demand growth in the experiment as a geometric Brownian
motion, we calculate the 95% confidence interval of demand growth over 23 years,
which corresponds to 10 periods in the experiment. We set this interval for the exper-
iment to [0.7%, 2.3%], which is similar to the range of scenarios given by the IEA.
The average demand growth per period is 3.5%, with a 95% confidence-interval of
[−2.1%, 9.4%]. Over longer time periods, this confidence interval becomes smaller,
as we would have to take the average over some high growth and some low growth
periods.
C.4 Choice of other parameters
The parameter KMAX is the limit on the amount of investment in capacity the
network operator can make every 3 periods. This was intended to reflect that large
increases in capacity are technically feasible. Along the optimal investment path, the
maximum is not binding. If the network operator invests the maximum KMAX = 5
units whenever he could, total capacity would be 54, much larger than total demand,
which always remains lower than 22 units.
The initial network capacity K0 is set at a level relative to initial demand so that
the network operator would make a similar investment in the first period as in all
subsequent periods.
The parameters γ and κ adjust the demand function for the first two units of demand
for each network user. These are set to reflect the tradeoff from taking on large commit-
ments to supply powerful downstream users. These require a specific investment, are
very profitable if fulfilled, and particularly costly to fail to fulfill. With the parameters
we have chosen, network users will only make a loss on these contracts if they do not
obtain any network capacity in the market. If they obtain at least 2 units, they make a
profit of at least 60 ECU.
Appendix D: Instructions
The following section contains the text of the instructions for the price cap treatment.
Additions or replacements made in the instructions for the Holiday- and Forward
Auction treatment respectively are indicated as such.
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Welcome!
Thank you very much for your participation in this experiment! If you follow the instructions 
carefully and make good decisions, you can earn a considerable amount of money, which will 
be paid to you in cash at the end of the experiment.
The experiment will be made up of a series of periods. You are either a Type A or a Type B 
Player. There will be exactly 4 Type A Players and 1 Type B Player in the experiment. You will 
remain the same type of player in each period. 
The money used in the experiment is ECU, or Experimental Currency Units. The ECU that you 
earn in the experiment will be converted to Euros and paid to you.
In each period, there will be a good sold called X. Type A Players can earn money by buying X, 
while the Type B Player can earn money by selling X. 
Pages ( ) discuss specific information for Type A Players while Pages () discuss specific 




Specific Instructions for Type A Players
Type A Players can earn money by buying X at low prices.
Buying X:
In each period you can buy units of a good called X. You will receive ECU for each unit of X 
that you buy in each period. The amount of ECU that each unit of X that you buy pays to you is 
shown on your computer screen at the beginning of each period. The X that you buy only lasts 
one period, so you need to buy more X each period to earn money in every period. 
Please consider now Screenshot 1 issued to you separately. Its layout is similar to many screens 
which a Type A Player will encounter. Each period from 1 – 6 is shown in a different column. 
The first number in each “Period column” is the amount of ECU you receive from the first unit 
of X that you buy in a period. The second number in each column is the additional amount of 
ECU that you receive from the second unit that you buy in a period, etc… The amount of ECU 
you receive for a particular unit of X is also called “Valuation”
In every period, you will have valuations for six (6) units of X. Note though that if the amount 
of ECU indicated for a particular unit of X (Your Valuation for that unit) is 0, then you will not 
receive any ECU for it. Only you know your own Valuations.
Bonus Values:
Type A Players may pay some money to increase the ECU that some of the units they buy pay 
off. If you do so, your decision is in effect for the next six periods. You have three options:
You can pay a total of 60 ECU, which will be charged to you in the form of 10 ECU 
each period for the next 6 periods, to increase the ECU you receive for the first two 
units you buy by 20 ECU each. This Option is called Bonus Valuation 1.
You can pay a total of 120 ECU, which will be charged to you in the form of 20 ECU 
each period for the next 6 periods, to increase the ECU you receive for the first two 
units you buy by 40 ECU each. This Option is called Bonus Valuation 2.
You can pay 0 ECU and not change the amount of money you receive for the X you 
buy. This Option is called Standard Valuation.
The raise in the amount of ECU you receive for the first two units of X is indicated b
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The Market for X
In each period, units of X are sold to Type A Players in an auction. One auction for X takes 
place in each period. To buy units of X, you must place bids for them. You must place a bid for 
all six units for which you have a valuation (i.e. also for those for which your valuation is 0), 
The outcome of the auction is determined according to the following rules:
The players who make the highest bids receive the X being sold.
For example, suppose that the Type B Player offers 5 units of X in period 1.
Then, in the auction in period 1, the players who made the five highest bids receive 
units, one unit for each of the bids they have among the top five.
The price that every winning bidder pays equals the lowest of the winning bids.
In the example above with five units for sale, the lowest winning bi d is the fifth highest 
bid. 
Consider the following illustration of the previous example. The table below indicates the 
hypothetical bids of the four Type A Players (named Player 1 through Player 4) for X in period 
1:
Player 1 Player 2 Player 3 Player 4
13 12 9 5
6 7 4 5
0 3 4 4
0 0 0 3
0 0 0 1
0 0 0 1
Remember that we assume that there are five units of X for sale.
The five highest bids are 13 , 12 , 9 , 7 and 6.
The players who submitted these bids receive one unit of X for each of these top five 
bids:
Player 1 receives 2 units of X (13, 6)
Player 2 receives 2 units of X (12, 7)
Player 3 receives 1 unit of X   (9)
Player 4 receives no units of X
The price that every winning bidder pays is equal to the lowest of the winning bids. In 
this example, the lowest winning bid is 6.
Player 1 receives 2 units of X for a price of 6 ECU per unit.
Player 2 receives 2 units of X for a price of 6 ECU per unit.
Player 3 receives 1 unit of X for a price of 6 ECU per unit.
Player 4 receives no units of X
If there are more bids equal to the winning bid, it will be randomly determined by the program 
who of the players which submitted these bids will receive the unit of X.
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Your income as a Type A player
In each period, your income as a type A player is equal to: 
The value of X you have purchased 
+ bonus values on units you have purchased 
- money you spend in the auction for X
- money you spend on bonus values
Timing
The following table shows the actions you will need to take in every block of 6 periods. In 
period 1, you can choose a bonus value and then buy X. In periods 2 6, you can buy X. There 
is a cycle of six periods, so that period 7 is the same as period 1, period 8 the same as period 2, 
PERIOD
1 2 3 4 5 6
a. Choose Bonus Value x
b. Buy X x x x x x X
On the top left corner of every screen in the game, the program tells you exactly at which point 
you are. If you again have a look at Screenshot 1, you can see that this particular screen 
provides you with summary information (about your valuations and your bonus choice) just 
prior to the auction for X in Period 1. It reads: Period 1.b: Summary. With this information and 
the table above you can always find out at which point in the game you are!
(6) Specific Instructions for the Type B Player
The Type B Player can earn money by selling X.
Selling X & Expanding Capacity
In each period, the Type B Player sells units of X. The maximum amount that she can sell is 
called her capacity. So if her cap
in the auction for X. In every auction of X, the Type A Players submit their bids before the 
Type B Player decides on the amount of X that she wants to sell. The Type B Player can offer 
her entire capacity, that is she sells as many units of X as she can. The Type B Player is 
however also free to offer less (but at most 10 units of X less than capacity is available).
For her capacity, the Type B Player incurs a cost: 10 ECU in every period f or each capacity 
unit, regardless of whether it is actually used to sell X or not.
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(7)
The Type B Player has the opportunity to increase her capacity in every third period, beginning 
in period 1. At each of these instances, she can increase her capacity by at most 5 units. The 
capacity of X the Type B Player starts with in Period 1 is 4 units of X. Recall once more that for 
each unit of capacity that she has, she must pay 10 ECU in every period. If she increases her 
capacity, she can never decrease it in the future, and she must pay the 10 ECU fee every period 
for each unit of capacity she has until the end of the experiment. 
Your income as a Type B Player
(*)  
In each period, your income as a Type B Player is equal to: 
The money you receive from selling X
- money you spend on capacity
Timing
The following table shows the actions you will need to take in every block of 6 periods. In 
period 1 and period 4, can increase your capacity and sell X. In periods 2, 3, and 5, you sell X. 
There is a cycle of six periods, so that period 7 is the same as period 1, period 8 the same as 
PERIOD
1 2 3 4 5 6
a. Increase Capacity x x
b. Sell X x x x x x x
FURTHER PROCEEDINGS IN THIS SESSION
After we have read these instructions together, you will have the opportunity to ask questions. 
Then the experimenter will issue a quiz to check your understanding. Performance in the quiz is 
judged primarily by the correctness of your answers and secondarily on the speed in which you 
complete the quiz. The first participant with full points (or the highest amount of points in the 
quiz) will become the Type B Player. The four next best participants will attain the role as Type 
A Players. The remaining participants will receive 10 Euros for their participation and are asked 
to leave.
periods (2 blocks). This run is conducted to familiarize you with the procedures and the screens 
of the experiment. In the first one or two periods, the experimenter will go through the screens 
with you together and explain to you what you see on each screen. As this run is intended to 
familiarize you with the experiment, the decisions you take in these 12 periods do not affect 
your payment at the end of the experiment.
The second run consists of 30 periods (5 blocks). Your performance in this run determines your 
payment at the end of the experiment.
The third and final run consists of 30 periods as well, and again your performance in this run 
determines your payment at the end of the experiment.
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The proceedings in all of the three runs are identical.
After each run, the computer will prompt you to enter your first and last name. This is solely for 
the purpose of paying you after the experiment. At no point will that information be published! 
Also, after each run the experimenter will come to you and restart the program in order to 
prepare for the next run.
YOUR PAYMENT
Payment for Type A Players
In the second and third run, you will be informed on a screen at the onset of the run how the 
amount of ECU is converted to Euros. This conversion can differ between the second and the 
third run, as can your valuations. The sum of your earnings in the second and third run 
determines your payment. You will receive a loan of 500 ECU in the first period of the game 
(to cover temporary losses, if any) but that loan will automatically be deducted in the final 
period of the experiment.
Payment for the Type B Player
In the second and third run, you will be informed on a screen at the onset of the run how the 
amount of ECU is converted to Euros. This conversion can differ between the second and the 
third run. The sum of your earnings in the second and third run determines your payment. You 
will receive a loan of 500 ECU in the first period of the game (to cover temporary losses, if 
any) but that loan will automatically be deducted in the final period of the experiment.
In addition, you will receive a lump sum payment of 30 Eurocent for each period in runs 2 and 
3.
The following changes are made for the different treatments: 
(1) IN FA REPLACED BY 
In each period, there will be a good sold called X. In every sixth period, beginning in period 1, 
there will be another good sold, called insurance. Type A players can earn money by buying X 
and insurance, while the type B player can earn money by offering X and selling insurance for 
X.
(2) IN FA REPLACED BY 
Type A players can earn money by buying X and by buying insurance at low prices. 
(3) ADDITIONAL SECTION IN FA
Buying Insurance: 
In every sixth period, beginning in period 1, you can submit bids for insurance. This occurs 
before you choose your bonus values and before the Market for X in that period. You can bid 
for it in an auction with the same rules as the market for X (see the previous section). You can 
purchase as many units of insurance as you would like, at most six units though, provided that 
your bids are high enough and that there are enough units of insurance for sale. The Type B 
Player decides in every third period, beginning in period 1, how much insurance she wants to 
sell. You do however only submit bids every sixth period (just before you decide on your bonus 
values), and these bids determine how much insurance you will obtain each time the Type B 
player offers insurance.
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If you receive a unit of insurance, it lasts until the next time you submit bids for 
insurance
In each period until then, it pays you an amount equal to the price of X in that period
However, you also pay the auction price for the insurance in every period that it lasts
For example, if you obtain 2 units of insurance for a price of 20 ECU in the insurance auction in 
period 1, then you have to pay 2 x 20 = 40 in periods 1-3. If the Type B player decides not to 
offer any additional units of insurance in period 4, you will pay that amount in periods 4-6 as 
well.
The reason it is called insurance is the following. 
(1) Suppose that you do not buy a unit of X in the auction for X because the auction price 
was too high, but you have insurance. Then, you can still benefit from the high price of X. This 
is because one unit of insurance gives you a payment equal to the price for one unit of X. That 
means that the higher the price of X is, the higher your insurance payout.
(2) If you buy a unit of X, you can get a refund equal the price you pay if you have a unit 
of insurance. This means that you do not pay anything for the unit of X you bought. Remember 
though that you still have to pay for the insurance you bought.
(4) IN FA REPLACED BY 
The value of X you have purchased 
+ bonus values on units you have purchased 
+ insurance payouts you receive 
- money you spend in the auction for X
- money you spend in the auction for insurance
- money you spend on bonus values
(5) IN FA REPLACED BY 
The following table shows the actions you will need to take in every block of 6 periods. In 
period 1, you can buy insurance, then choose a bonus value and finally buy X. In periods 2 6, 
you can buy X. In Period 4c, you might receive additional insurance and the price for insurance 
might change if the Type B player decides to issue additional insurance. There is a cycle of six 
PERIOD
1 2 3 4 5 6
a. Buy Insurance x
b. Choose Bonus Value x
c. Additional Insurance x
d. Buy X x x X x X x
(6) PECIFIC INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE TYPE B PLAYER REPLACED IN FA BY
Specific Instructions for the Type B player
The Type B player can earn money by offering X and selling Insurance for X
In each period, the type B player must offer units of X. All units of X that the Type B Player 
can provide are automatically offered in the auction discussed on pages 2 and 3 of these 
instructions. The total number of units of X can provide is called her capacity. The capacity can 
be increased but never decreased. The capacity of X the type B player starts with in Period 1 is 
4 units of X. For each unit of capacity that the Type B player has, she incurs a cost of 10 ECU 
in every period. If she increases her capacity, she can never decrease it in the future, and she 
must pay the 10 ECU in every period for each unit of capacity she has until the end of the 
experiment. 
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The Type B player can increase her capacity every third period beginning from period 1 by at 
most 5 units. The Type B player is at the same time obliged to offer an identical number of 
insurance units to the Type A players. This is done automatically.
This requirement has important implications: Recall from the description of Insurance on page 
() that one unit of Insurance pays a Type A player exactly the Market price for X. Hence, the 
by the Type B player but instead entirely used to pay out the Type A players according to their 
holdings of Insurance. Put differently: The Type B player does not have any direct income 
from offering X to the Type A players.
However, the Type B player can make profits by selling Insurance for her capacity of X. Recall 
from above that the Type B player must sell one unit of insurance for every unit of her capacity 
of X. By increasing her capacity, the Type B player sells more Insurance to the Type A
 players in the Insurance auctions discussed on page 3. 
Recall that the Type A players submit bids for insurance every sixth period, i.e. in the first 
period of each six period block (that is in periods 1, 7, 13, 19, and 25). In contrast, the Type B 
player can increase her capacity (and hence offer additional insurance) every third period, and 
therefore in the first and fourth period of each six period block. Thus, at both opportunities for 
the Type B player to invest, the bids submitted by the Type A players in the first period of the 
current six period block are used.
Important: The maximum amount of ECU for selling one unit of insurance which the Type B 
player is allowed to keep is limited: In case the price for Insurance the Type A players have to 
pay in the insurance auction described on pages 3 and 4 turns out to be higher than 15 ECU per 
unit, the Type B player will only receive the 15 ECU per unit of insurance while the difference 
between the payments of the Type A players and that amount is kept by the computer. Only if 
the market price for Insurance is below 15 ECU, the type B player will obtain the market price 
for Insurance. Thus, the Type B player can at most receive 15 ECU for each unit of 
insurance she sells.
The screen that the Type B Player will see when she has to decide on her capacity and number 
of insurance units to sell for the next three periods is depicted in Screenshot 2.  On the left you 
see a column of red buttons. By pressing one of these, the Type B Player decides on the number 
of insurance units she sells. If she presses the button at the top, she does not increase her 
capacity over the current amount and hence does not sell any additional Insurance as well. If 
she presses the second button, she sells one additional unit of insurance on top of that, if she 
presses the third one she sells two additional units of insurance and so on. For every choice the 
screen provides her with the total number of capacity and insurance units which she would then 
sell (second column), the price per unit of insurance she would receive until the next 
opportunity to increase her capacity (third column) and finally the profit which she makes by 
selling them. The profit shown already considers the costs which the Type B player incurs for 
each unit of capacity.
Note well: The profit displayed is the amount of ECU you make per period from selling the 
respective number of insurance units. The profit numbers thus tell you how much ECU you can 
earn with certainty in each remaining period of the current six period block.
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Example1:
Assume that you are in Period 7, hence the first period of the second six period block. Assume 
that by adding one additional unit of capacity (and hence one additional unit of insurance) the 
profit indicated is 40 ECU. Thus you will receive 40 ECU until period 12 (the final period of 
that block), assuming that in Period 10, the second opportunity to expand your capacity / and 
sell additional insurance in the second block, you decide not to add any additional capacity.
Example 2:
We are in the same situation as above, however you are now in period 10 and decide to add 
capacity in that period as well. Assume your indicated profit is then 45 ECU. You will then 
obtain 45 ECU in periods 10, 11 and 12.
Your income as a type B player
In each period, your income as a type B player is equal to: 
The money you receive from selling Insurance
- money you spend on capacity
Timing
The following table shows the actions you will need to take in every block of 6 periods. In 
period 1 and 4, you decide on your capacity and on the amount of insurance you sell. There is a 
cycle of six periods, so that period 7 is the same as period 1, period 8 the same as period 2, 
PERIOD
1 2 3 4 5 6
Increase Capacity & Sell Insurance x x
(7) ADDITIONAL TEXT IN THE REGULATORY HOLIDAY TREATMENT 
You earn money by selling X to the Type A players. The amount of money you receive in a 
period from selling X depends not only on the bids which the Type B players submit and the 
amount of X that you offer but also on the expansion of capacity during every six period block 
(the blocks are illustrated on page 3 and on page 7 and start in periods 1, 7, 13, 19 and 25 
respectively)
For all units of X which you can provide with capacity that was already available during the 
previous block, you obtain a regulated price. That price is equal to 15 ECU for each unit of X 
sold if the market price, that is the price which the Type A players pay (refer to page 2 on how 
that one is calculated), is equal to or higher than 15 ECU. You receive the market price only if 
it is lower than 15 ECU.
For units of X which you can only offer because you have increased your capacity during the 
current six period block, you receive the full market price, even if it is higher than 15 ECU. 
Remember that during each six period block, you can increase your capacity twice: Once in the 
first period of the six period block and then once more three periods later (Have a look at the 
table on page 7 for an illustration). Please consider the following example which illustrates how 
your profit as a Type B player is calculated:
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The screen that the Type B Player will see during the stage of deciding on how much of her 
capacity to use is depicted in Screenshot 2. By pressing one of the red buttons on the left, she 
decides on the amount of X to sell. By pressing the highest button, she sells the maximum 
possible number of X (her entire capacity), by pressing the one below she sells one unit less, 
and so on. For every possible choice, the screen tells her the amount of X she would sell at the 
regulated price (which is also provided), the amount of X she would sell at the market price 
(which is also provided) and finally her profit (her income) from selling X. 
Remember: Regardless of whether the Type B Player offers her entire capacity or less, she will 
incur the cost of 10 ECU for every unit of her capacity. This cost is included in the calculation 
of the profit that is shown in the final column in the screen depicted in Screenshot 2.
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